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1. Introduction
My previous research sought to address the general question of whether the use of virtual
worlds and video games may induce experiences that fit the language used to describe dis‐
sociative disorders. The method of investigation was the development of a survey instru‐
ment based on the Structured Clinical Interview for Depersonalization – Derealization
Spectrum (Mula et al., 2008). The new survey was in turn administered to a population of
users of the virtual world Second Life. While results from this initial study provided some
provisional insights the question that motivated this research remains worthy of further at‐
tention. In fact this question was originally arose from a consideration of a more general
question: how do we distinguish what it real from what is virtual? From this initial question
it is possible to tease out a number of questions deserving of further investigation.
A significant number of people spend a significant amount of time using virtual worlds for
gaming and entertainment. According to the market research company KZERO WORLD‐
WIDE (http://www.kzero.co.uk/) the cumulative total of registered accounts for virtual
worlds, MMOs (massive multi-player online games) and social gaming stands at 1.92 billion.
The Entertainment Software Association (http://www.theesa.com/facts/index.asp) reports
that 72 percent of American households play computer or video games. According to the
Pew Research Center 97 percent of teens in the United States play videogames of some sort.
(Pew Research Center 2008).
Edward Castronova argues  that  virtual  worlds  and games attract  our  attention because
they offer more positive experiences than the real world. This places the real and the vir‐
tual in competition for people’s time and attention. Castronova invokes simple economic
theory to claim, that “the real world is going to lose.” (Castronova 2008). With Castrono‐
va’s  exodus  people  are  “moving their  attention,  not  their  bodies,  and they  are  moving
back and forth all the time.”
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If Castronova is right and the data on the growing numbers of users of games and virtual
worlds appear to support his speculations, then we need to understand how is it that people
“are moving back and forth all the time” but manage not to confuse the real and the virtual.
We need to understand why and how “reality testing is intact” as people migrate back and
forth from the real to the virtual.
The use of virtual worlds is no longer an activity at the margins of society. It is now a part of
the cultural fabric. Yet we have a poor understanding of the impact of this activity on the
psychological well being of players. More to the point we do not understand how human
beings sort out the differences between virtual experiences and real life experiences. How is
it that most people easily recognize and separate these two domains of experience?
In the near future this ability will be challenged. Rapid advances in wearable computing
(compact computational and sensing devices molded to comfortably fit the human body)
have introduced new viewing devices that promise to further blur the lines between the real
and the virtual. Announced in April 2012 Goggle’s Project Glass introduces augmented real‐
ity eyewear that offers anywhere, anytime connectivity (Hill 2012). The display visible with
the eyewear merges together a view of the real world with the overlay of the capabilities of
web browsers and smartphones.
The Rift Project developed by Oculus will introduce Virtual Reality goggles in early 2013
that feature an extremely high resolution display with head motion tracking for the home
market for games. As video gaming experiences become increasingly realistic, engaging and
immersive how will users/players distinguish real experiences from virtual experiences?
What of their long-term memories of these experiences? Will those memories of virtual ex‐
periences intermingle with memories of “real” experiences? What of dreams? Anecdotal ac‐
counts suggest that players do have dreams about gaming experiences.
With augmented reality the distinction between the real and the virtual collapses and be‐
comes a single unified experience. A person viewing the Grand Canyon through augmented
reality glasses might a see text overlay identifying prominent features of that landscape. It
seems quite unlikely that someone might confuse this text overlay as part of the observed
reality as they can simply take off the glasses and view the natural world as it is. But what if
that overlay includes a video conferencing feature similar to Skype? The individual sees a
Park Ranger (who is not physically there) and hears the voice of the Ranger through their
ear buds (headphones built into the glasses). The Park Ranger responds to questions, ges‐
tures to geological features in the environment (much like the weather man or woman
against a green screen), engages in conversation and can even make eye contact.
For all intents and purposes this experience is real, feels real to the viewer and will be re‐
membered just as vividly (perhaps even more so?) as the experience of talking to a person
standing next to him or her on the South Rim. What is substantively different about this ex‐
perience is that it is a broadband, information rich, real time interaction. This experience
completely engages the participant in the visual, auditory domains and more importantly in
the realm of human social affairs.
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A determined materialist might argue that this is simply a pseudo question and concern. We
know the physics and electrical engineering of how the bits and bytes are represented as
electrical impulses and stored on a hard drive. The engineering is well established for how
the data is read, parsed into instructions and the algorithms are executed, while user input is
processed resulting in the real time display of 3D computer graphics along with the play‐
back of stereo sound. We know a great about the systems of visual and auditory processing,
from the anatomy of the eye and ear to the neural correlates in the brain. The reductionist
can confidently say that we objectively know what is out there, is real. We thoroughly un‐
derstand the science and engineering how the virtual worlds are generated. The light from a
pattern of pixels that hits the retina is just as “real” as light coming from the “real” or natu‐
ral world. We even understand a great deal about perception, both how the brain creates the
world out there from sensory inputs to even how the brain processes illusions.
But that is not the point. This reductionist argument is like trying to explain the experience
of reading a novel by describing the technology of papermaking, publishing and printing.
The real question centers on that human capacity to imagine fictitious worlds when hearing
or reading stories or watching a play or film or play a game.
What is happening when we experience the “suspension of disbelief”? What is this capacity
to simultaneously know that the experience (reading fiction, watching a play or movie) is
not real but still responding as if it were real? When dreaming one’s motor control is sup‐
pressed. When we read a book, watch a play or film we remain seated. When we play a vid‐
eo game we interact within the constraints defined by the interface. Historically game
interaction has been accomplished by use of a mouse and keyboard, or with the buttons on a
game controller. More recently motion tracking and motion sensing technologies motion
used with the Wii or Microsoft Kinect make it possible to interact using one’s whole body.
There  is  also  the  temptation  to  dismiss  this  as  a  topic  best  suited  for  an  introductory
class in philosophy. After all the question of what is the reality of the virtual is an epis‐
temological  one.  Yet this does not mean that such questions have to be abandoned and
left  to  metaphysics.  Testing  a  series  of  questions  and gathering  data  using  quantitative
and qualitative methods can provide meaningful  results.  To return to the question sug‐
gested at the onset of this chapter, does the language used to describe the diagnostic cri‐
teria  for  dissociative  disorders  specifically  from  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of
Mental Disorders: Fourth Edition, Text Revision (2000), apply to experience of using virtu‐
al worlds or playing games?
In the DSM–IV–TR dissociative disorders are described as the “disruption in the usually in‐
tegrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment”
and “partial or complete loss of the normal integration between memories of the past,
awareness of identity and immediate sensations, and control of bodily movements.” Why is
it that frequent migrations between the real and virtual do not trigger a “disruption in the
usually integrated functions…”? If a subject presents symptoms of dissociation in real life
do these symptoms carry over or are aggravated by use of a virtual world like Second Life
(http://secondlife.com/)?
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The DSM-IV-TR acknowledges that dissociative states “occur frequently and are not inher‐
ently pathological” and are even “sought-after experiences as part of long standing religious
and cultural rituals and practices.” Many conditions present similar clusters of symptoms,
yet the language used in the DSM for the diagnostic criteria for depersonalization and de-
realization is a fitting description for how avatars (the user’s onscreen representation in a
virtual world or game) look “unreal” and one's surroundings looks “unreal” in a virtual
worlds like the SIMS, The World of Warcraft or Second Life. These virtual worlds are all com‐
puter generated 3D computer graphics simulations that in spite of considerable advances in
real time rendering fall well short of photo-realism and still look fake and cartoonish.
The DSM-IV-TR uses the following criteria for derealization: “The perception or experience
of the external world so that it seems strange or unreal; Feeling as though one's environment
is lacking in spontaneity, emotional colouring and depth.” In Second Life the objects, archi‐
tecture and avatars representing other residents appear “strange and unreal” and are “lack‐
ing in spontaneity, emotional coloring (especially other avatars) and depth.”
The diagnostic criteria for Item 300.6 Depersonalization Disorder specifies the following:
“Persistent or recurrent feelings of being detached from one’s mental processes or body; as if
an observer; During depersonalization, reality testing is intact.” In Second Life users see their
avatars from a default point-of-view (POV) slightly above and behind their “in world” ava‐
tar. This is not unlike descriptions of out-of-body experiences. Users can also use a viewing
technique called mouse-look which makes it possible for a user to view his or her own ava‐
tar as if it were someone else. Avatars controlled by other users can “seem unfamiliar or me‐
chanical” or “robotic”.
Updated in DSM-IV-TR, Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) refers to the “presence of two
or more distinct identities or personality states” that “recurrently take control” of a person’s
behavior. It is a common practice for Second Life users to have multiple “in-world” avatars
(known as alts) that can be of a different gender. The user effectively takes on a different
personality and behavior when employing a different avatar.
2. A Survey and results
It is an informal observation to say that the language of the diagnostic criteria of the DSM is
an apt description of the experience using a virtual world like Second Life. To say that a com‐
puter generated simulation of a world looks “strange, unreal” or that the avatars in that vir‐
tual world “seem unfamiliar or mechanical” or “robotic” is a matter-of-fact statement.
Similarly asserting that for most users and players “reality testing is intact” is likewise an
uncontroversial truism.
To suggest that users and players who have multiple avatars may experience something
akin to dissociative identity disorder is another matter. These terms and phrases have real
import when used as part of the diagnostic criteria for dissociative disorders. If users self-
report and respond in the affirmative to a self-administered questionnaire related to the di‐
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agnostic criteria then there may be something worth further scrutiny. In order to conduct a
more systematic investigation the development of a survey instrument and its deployment
was required.
The Structured Clinical Interview for Depersonalization – Derealization Spectrum (SCI-
DER) (Mula et al., 2008) was chosen as a model for a new survey. Questions were selected
on the basis of how well they applied to the experience of using Second Life. Those questions
that referenced situations that could only be experienced in “real life” were not used. Some
questions were used as is or were minimally rewritten to clearly reference the experience of
using Second Life. This newly created survey instrument was administered to a select popu‐
lation of users of Second Life. A parsimonious interpretation of the initial results, suggest that
a significant number of survey respondents agreed that the descriptions of dissociative ex‐
periences based on the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IV-TR do apply to the experience of
using virtual worlds.
The SCI-DER introduces the survey questions with this general question: “Have you ever
experienced just for a few seconds or for days or months. …” After that each of the specific
questions follow such as the first: … that the outside world was strange and unreal?
This preface from the SCI_DER is rewritten for the new survey as: “While in Second Life have
you ever experienced just for a few seconds or for a longer period of time…” The first question
is modified as follows to refer directly to the experience of being logged into Second Life.
…that the virtual world was strange and unreal?”
Questions were added that addressed gender, age and length of time spent as a registered
user (resident) of Second Life. In the end the new survey instrument comprised a total of 23
questions. Respondents answered Yes or No to each. While the SCI-DER is considered a va‐
lidated instrument with high reliability, this new survey does not make any such claims.
Additionally this new survey was not intended to be used for the purposes of diagnosis. The
survey was administered by the Social Research Foundation (http://www.socialresearch‐
foundation.org/) to a sample population of 110 “residents” of Second Life. Respondents
completed the survey online anonymously. The following charts show sample results of this
new survey using questions modified from the SCI-DER. As noted above the list of twenty-
three questions is prefaced by this general question:
While in Second Life have you ever experienced just for a few seconds or for a longer period of time…
…that the virtual world was strange and unreal?
Question 1 uses the descriptive phrase directly from the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IV-
TR and corresponds to the first domain of questions in the SCI-DER. Items in this domain
focus on derealization or “referring to an altered experience of the external world (Mula et
al., 2008).” Question 2 is another example of this domain. Survey responses suggest that it is
“normal” and expected to view other avatars and objects as “not real” when logged into
Second Life. Indeed it is likely a desirable and sought after experience whereas to experience
the “real” world as “strange and unreal” is disturbing and potentially disabling.
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… having the feeling that other avatars, objects, and the ‘in-world’ environment around you were
not real?
Question 12 references the Somatopsychic depersonalization domain which “describes a variety
of changes in body experience such as lack of body ownership feelings, feelings of disem‐
bodiment, which can range from a nonspecific feeling of not being in the body to out-of-
body experiences and autoscopic hallucinations (Mula et al., 2008).”
… that you were not in charge of your avatar’s movements, so that you felt “automatic” and mechan‐
ical as if you were a robot?
Questions  17  and  18  reference  the  third  domain  of  Auto  Psychic  depersonalization
which  includes  “unfamiliarity  of  the  self  in  terms  of  sensation  of  being  an  outside  ob‐
server  of  one’s  mental  process,  not  being  ‘in  charge’  of  their  own  behavior  or  mental
processes,  the automaton-line experience and anomalous subjective recall.”  Yes respons‐
es  are  not  surprising  given  that  the  default  viewpoint  in  Second  Life  is  from a  vantage
point  slightly  above  and  behind  their  “in-world”  avatar.  In  fact  residents  often  use
Mouse  Look  (Second  Life  Wikia,  n.d.)  where  it  is  possible  to  move  the  camera  repre‐
senting  their  avatar’s  point-of-view,  independent  of  the  location  of  their  avatar.  This
makes  it  possible  to  observe  their  own  avatar  as  if  they  were  “detached  from  one’s
body;” as  if  “an observer.”
… that you were a “detached observer”?
Question 18 references the déjà vu experience.  Sims (simulations) in Second Life have a
sameness to them because of the basic technology consists of complex shapes built out of
primitive shapes with simple texture maps. Question 18 also references item 300.13 Dis‐
sociative Fugue in the DSM-IV-TR where the “predominant disturbance is sudden, unex‐
pected travel away from home or one's customary place of work, with inability to recall
one's past.”
… that when in a new situation, you had been there before?
Question 23 references the DSM-IV-TR category 300.14 Dissociative Identity Disorder. Male
and female responses differ by only 1.5 percentage points. These results suggest that nearly
half of the population of residents use “alts” or alternative avatars that have “distinct per‐
sonalities.” It is not clear from these responses if these personalities take control but most
Second Life users enact or “perform” their avatar in a way consistent with its appearance.
Item 300.14 Dissociative Fugue is also implicated here as it involves “Confusion about per‐
sonal identity, or the assumption of a new identity, (partial or complete).”
… that you use two or more distinct avatars having different personalities?
Some  value  lies  in  this  survey’s  potential  to  define  and  recognize  potential  manifesta‐
tions  that  (weakly)  correlate  to  DSM-IV  diagnostic  criteria.  This  has  led  to  further  re‐
search questions (as noted above) that suggest the development of new instruments and
methodologies.
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3. Other considerations
Digital games conjure up virtual worlds by means of graphical displays. Play further estab‐
lishes the divide between the real and the virtual by demarcating what play theorists call the
magic circle. First described by Huizinga in his seminal work on play (1955) the magic circle
is a place set apart for not only play but also much more:
“All play moves and has its being within a play-ground marked off beforehand either materially or ideally, deliberately or as a
matter of course. Just as there is no formal difference between play and ritual, so the ‘consecrated spot’ cannot be formally distin‐
guished from the play-ground. The arena, the card-table, the magic circle, the temple, the stage, the screen, the tennis court, the
court of justice, etc., are all in form and function play-grounds, i.e. forbidden spots, isolated, hedged round, hallowed, within which
special rules obtain. All are temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart.”
Gregory Bateson (1972) links play to Goffman’s frame analysis (1974): “play occurs within a
delimited psychological frame, a spatial and temporal bounding of a set of interactive mes‐
sages.” Goffman himself aims at a certain granularity of experience by using the term
“strip” by which he means “any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity,
including here sequences of happenings, real or fictive, as seen from the perspective of those
subjectively involved in sustaining an interest in them (Goffman 1974).” In a similar fashion
Zerubavel (1991) speaks of “mental fences,” which “delimit geographical areas, historical
events, people, ideas, and so on that appear to be contiguous, similar, functionally related,
or otherwise associated.” Zerubavel, (1991) reminds us that boundaries allow us to “visually
as well as mentally to grasp any entity at all.”
Salen and Zimmerman (2003) link Huizinga’s (1955) notion of the ‘magic circle’ to Bateson’s
analysis of play as a frame that “delimits the peculiar space of play.” When someone engag‐
es in play, he/she crosses a boundary (into the magic circle) that separates the artificial
world of the game from “real life.” The magic circle is a frame that sets a thick boundary
between real life and the make believe of game play. This cognitive frame establishes the
“reality” of the game. Anthropologist Tom Boellstroff (2008) suggests that the “magic cir‐
cle”– may constitute a virtual world meaningful in its own right. Bateson points out that this
is a paradoxical state of mind (Bateson 1972, p. 84). For the player the game is simultaneous‐
ly real and not real. This boundary is likewise thin–the player can easily stop and step in‐
stantly back into “real life.”
Work-family-life border/boundaries theories (Ashforth 2000; Clark 2000) likewise make use
of the concepts of boundaries and borders to understand how daily life is “sliced” into dis‐
crete domains. These theories study the conflicts and interactions that arise between the do‐
mains of work, family life and what is termed third places defined as social activities outside
the home or work place. This partitioning makes it possible for “one to concentrate more on
whatever domain is currently salient and less on other domains.”
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These borders can be both flexible and permeable. Behavior can spill  over from one do‐
main into  another  when flexible  boundaries  allow a  role  to  “be  enacted in  various  set‐
tings  as  various  times  (Ashforth  et  al.  2000).”  Flexible  borders  or  boundaries  can  be
characterized by the “degree to which the spatial  and temporal boundaries are pliable.”
A  role  having  flexible  boundaries  “can  be  enacted  in  various  settings  and  at  various
times”.  Permeability  can be  measured as  “the  degree  to  which  a  role  allows one  to  be
physically located in the role’s domain but psychologically and/or behaviorally involved
in another role (Ashforth et al. 2000).”
The framework of border/boundary theory does not take into account domains beyond so-
called third places. I have argued elsewhere (Garvey 2010) that the virtual should be consid‐
ered as a fourth place. The analytical tool set of work-family-life border/boundary theories
does not capture the full dynamic of the phenomena of immersion in the domains of virtual
worlds and video games. These theories as currently formulated have little to say about how
gamers are “quite facile at juggling roles” and how gamers can easily and quickly navigate
back and forth between the domains of play (the virtual) and real life.
4. Toward a new survey
The foregoing discussion suggests that a number a new survey instruments could be de‐
vised that would examine the notion of the magic circle, paradoxical states of mind as mani‐
fested in game play, role-playing and boundaries. Goffman’s notion of frames has enormous
intuitive appeal but suffers from an awkwardness of how to design experimental questions
that get at this idea, that are testable and indeed quantifiable. Boundaries and borders have
likewise a certain conceptual appeal. But as discussed above the border/boundary frame‐
work suffers from certain limitations when we try to apply this framework beyond the
work/family balance framework.
The Boundary Questionnaire (Hartmann, 1991; Hartmann, Harrison and Zborowski 2001)
offers another approach to using the notion of boundaries as an investigative tool. The BQ is
a 138-item instrument that covers 12 categories of boundaries. Hartmann et al. point out that
there is a long tradition in the field of psychology of investigating “perceptual boundaries,
boundaries related to thoughts and feelings, boundaries between states of awareness or con‐
sciousness, sleep-dream-wake boundaries, boundaries related to memory, body boundaries,
interpersonal boundaries, boundaries related to sexual identity and other forms of identity,
group boundaries, and boundaries in opinions and judgments.” Hartmann et al. (1991;
2001), distinguish thick (solid) boundaries from thin or permeable boundaries. They have al‐
so developed a theory of dreams based on a “wake-dreaming continuum (Hartman 1989;
Hartmann & Kunzendorf 2007).” This continuum begins on one end with “focused waking
thought” having thick boundaries characterized by “solid, divisions, categorizations.” On
the other end of the continuum is “Dreaming” having “thin boundaries” characterized as
“merging, condensation, loosening of categories.” Hartmann et al. (2001) introduces the fol‐
lowing table compiling types of boundaries:
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Perceptual boundaries
Between sensory inputs
Sensory focus or “bandwidth”
Around perceptual entities
Boundaries related to thoughts and feelings
Between two thoughts or two feelings
Between thought and feeling
Around thoughts and feelings (free association)
Boundaries between states of awareness or states of consciousness
Sleep-dream-wake boundaries
Between sleep and waking
Between dreaming and waking
In and around the dream
Daydreaming
Boundaries related to play
Boundaries related to memory
Early memories
Recent memories and memory organization
Personal past
Future plans
Boundaries around oneself (body boundaries)
Barriers against stimuli
The skin as a boundary
Posture and musculature as boundaries
Personal space
Interpersonal boundaries
Boundaries between conscious and unconscious and between id, ego, and superego
Defense mechanisms as boundaries
Boundaries related to identity
Sexual identity
Age identity: Between adult and child
Constancy of identity
Group boundaries
Boundaries in organizing one’s life
Boundaries in environmental preferences
Boundaries in opinion and judgments
Boundaries in decision making and action
Table 1. Types of Boundaries (Hartmann et al. 2001)
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The Boundary Questionnaire (BQ) organizes those various kinds of boundaries into twelve
categories (Hartmann et al. 2001):
Category 1: Sleep/Dream/Waking
Category 2: Unusual Experiences
Category 3: Thoughts/Feelings/Moods
Category 4: Childhood/Adolescence/Adult
Category 5: Interpersonal
Category 6: Sensitivity
Category 7: Neat/Exact/Precise
Category 8: Edges/Lines/Clothing
Category 9: Opinions re Children, etc.
Category 10: Organizations
Category 11: Peoples/Nations/Groups
Category 12: Beauty/Truth
Table 2. Categories of Boundaries (Hartmann et al. 2001)
Hartmann et al. (2001) argue that “thick vs. thin boundaries appears to be a robust personal‐
ity measure, which can be considered an important dimension of personality.” Boundaries
related to “sexual identity” and “constancy of identity” are of direct relevance in a discus‐
sion of the use of avatars in virtual worlds and games. Thus the BQ might serve as a model
for a new survey. In order to make such an instrument relevant to the target population the
questions in the BQ could be slightly revised in a similar fashion to the approach described
above with the SCI-DER.
The following table (Hartmann et al. 2001) lists the each of the twelve categories of boun‐
dary types. Under each category are two sample items from original the BQ followed by re‐
visions of each items modified in such a way that it applies to the experience of using the
virtual world Second Life. Subjects are given instructions to rate each of the statements on a
scale from 0 to 4, where “0” indicates either the subject thinks the statement does not apply
to him/her (not at all or not at all true of me). A “4” indicates that the subject thinks the
statement definitely applies (true of me).
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Category 1: Sleep/Dream/Waking
1. When I awake in the morning, I am not sure whether I am really awake for a few minutes.
37. I spend a lot of time daydreaming, fantasizing, or in reverie.
Agreement with these questions are indicative of thin boundaries. Question 1 and 37 could be modified as follows:
1. When I awake in the morning, I am not sure for a few minutes whether I am logged into Second Life or really awake.
37. I spend a lot of time daydreaming, fantasizing, or in reverie about Second Life.
Category 2: Unusual Experiences
61. At times I have felt as if I were coming apart.
100. I have had déjà vu experiences.
The modified questions are:
61. At times while using Second Life I have felt as if I were coming apart.
100. In Second Life I have had déjà vu experiences.
Category 3: Thoughts/Feelings/Moods
15. Sometimes I don’t know whether I am thinking or feeling.
74. I can easily imagine myself to be an animal or what it might be like to be an animal.
In Second Life users can change the appearance of their avatar. A large group of users choose to be furries – avatars
that have animal heads, tails and paws. The modified questions are:
15. Sometimes while using Second Life I don’t know whether I am thinking or feeling.
74. In Second Life I can easily imagine myself to be a furry or what it might be like to be a furry.
Category 4: Childhood/Adolescence/Adult
4. I am very close to my childhood feelings.
40. I have definite plans for my future. I can lay out pretty well what I expect
year by year for the next few years.
The modified questions are:
4. I am very close to my childhood feelings when using Second Life.
40. I have definite plans for my future logins in Second Life. I can lay out pretty well what I expect year by year for the
next few years.
Category 5: Interpersonal
53. When I get involved with someone, we sometimes get too close.
103. I am a very open person.
The modified questions are:
53. When I get involved with someone in Second Life, we sometimes get too close.
103. In Second Life I am a very open person.
Category 6: Sensitivity
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6. I am very sensitive to other people’s feelings.
42. I am unusually sensitive to loud noises and bright lights.
The modified questions are:
6. While in Second Life I am very sensitive to other avatar’s feelings.
42. While in Second Life I am unusually sensitive to loud noises and bright lights.
Category 7: Neat/Exact/Precise
19. I keep my desk and work table neat and well organized.
43. I am good at keeping accounts and keeping track of my money.
In Second Life each user account has an inventory where the user can store various items such as clothing or objects.
The currency of Second Life is called Lindens and can be purchased using real money. Questions 19 and 43 can be
modified as:
19. With my Second Life account I keep my inventory and folders neat and well organized.
43. I am good at keeping accounts and keeping track of my Lindens in Second Life.
Category 8: Edges/Lines/Clothing
32. I like heavy, solid clothing.
44. I like stories that have a definite beginning, middle, and end.
The modified questions are:
32. When in Second Life I like clothing to have a heavy, solid look.
44. I like stories that have a definite beginning, middle, and end.
Category 9: Opinions re Children, etc.
33. Children and adults have a lot in common. They should give themselves a chance to be together without any strict
roles.
56. I think a good teacher must remain in part a child.
Table 3. Sample Items by Category
The following modification is problematic as Linden Labs (makers of Second Life) found it
necessary to age segregate users by creating a separate but equal version of Second Life for
teens. In fact underage role-playing is prohibited in Second Life for adults. The modified
questions are:
33. Children and adults have a lot in common. In Second Life they should give themselves a chance to
be together without any strict roles.
56. I think a good mentor must remain in part a child.
Category 10: Organizations
10. In an organization, everyone should have a definite place and a specific role.
58. A good relationship is one in which everything is clearly defined and spelled out.
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The modified questions are:
10. In Second Life, everyone should have a definite place and a specific role.
58. In Second Life, a good relationship is one in which everything is clearly defined and spelled out.
Category 11: Peoples/Nations/Groups
11. People of different nations are basically very much alike.
105. There are no sharp dividing lines between normal people, people with problems, and people who
are considered psychotic or crazy.
The modified questions are:
11. In Second Life people from different sims, groups and regions are basically very much alike.
105. In Second Life there are no sharp dividing lines between normal people, people with problems,
and people who are considered psychotic or crazy.
Category 12: Beauty/Truth
36. Either you are telling the truth or you are lying; that’s all there is to it.
76. When I am in a new situation, I try to find out precisely what is going on and what the rules are
as soon as possible.
The modified questions are:
36. Either you are telling the truth or you are lying; that’s all there is to it.
76. When I am in a new sim in Second Life, I try to find out precisely what is going on and what the
rules are as soon as possible.
A subject’s score is obtained by adding up all the scores (0-4) for all items. Some items are
scored backwards i.e. an answer of "0" is scored as 4, "1" is scored as 3, "2" is scored as 2, “3”
is scored as 1, and “4” is scored as 0. A reverse logic is built in to the questionnaire design so
respondents need to think about each response instead of answering mechanically. A subject
with a low score is interpreted as having “Thick boundaries” and those with higher scores
are determined to have “Thin boundaries.”
The prediction would be that subjects with thick boundaries would keep the domains of
the  real  and the  virtual  clearly  separate.  It  would also  be  expected that  subjects  whose
scores  are  low would be able  to  quickly navigate  back and forth and still  maintain the
boundaries.  Subjects  with  thin  boundaries  would  possibly  experience  spill  over  effects
from  one  domain  to  another.  Subjects  with  thick  boundaries  will  be  on  the  “focused
waking thought” end of the “wake-dreaming continuum” which is characterized by “sol‐
id,  divisions,  categorizations.”  Those  subjects  with  thin  boundaries  are  on  the  “Dream‐
ing”  end  of  the  continuum  characterized  as  “merging,  condensation,  loosening  of
categories.” Hartmann et  al.  (2001) notes:  “… people with thick boundaries spend more
time  and  find  themselves  more  comfortable  at  the  left-hand  end  of  our  continuum  in‐
volved in focused waking.  They can be considered, “thought people,” whereas the peo‐
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ple with thinner boundaries are more comfortable at the other end of the continuum and
can be thought of as “dream people,” although these terms are obviously an over-simpli‐
fication.”  The authors  acknowledge at  one time or  another  individuals  can exhibit  both
thin  and  thick  boundaries.  Most  individuals  experience  the  different  aspects  of  the
“wake-dreaming continuum” during the course of entire day.
Subjects with thin boundaries might be predicted to experience spill over effects such as
daydreaming about the virtual world or perhaps confusing dreams about the virtual world
with actual experiences as a user of that virtual world. However the BQ is not able to deter‐
mine exactly what those spill over effects might be, rather it predicts the tendency for a sub‐
ject to behave in a manner consistent with thin or thick boundaries. In fact it really is a
measure of self-assessment of attitudes in regard to each of the identified categories. To de‐
termine how a subject actually behaves, what they perceive, whether or not there are spill
over effects with daydreams or dream recall between the domains of the real and virtual
likely requires another research methodology. In related dream research Hartmann employs
a qualitative approach where subjects provide written descriptions of dreams. Such method‐
ologies may get at other details that quantitative measures miss.
As part of a theory of dreams Hartmann introduces the concept of a Central Image (Hart‐
mann & Kunzendorf 2006-7) or Contextualizing Image (Hartmann et al. 2001) that domi‐
nates in “big” and generally memorable dreams. The CI is often the feature that is readily
remembered about a dream. Individual with “thin boundaries” tend to remember their
dreams while individuals with “thick boundaries” tend to not remember their dreams. Do
users of virtual worlds with thin boundaries have dreams where there is a high intensity
Central Image based on their experiences in Second Life?
5. Conclusion
To make real progress in understanding the complex nature of the borders and boundaries
that separate the real from the virtual necessitates a multifaceted approach. A new “boun‐
dary questionnaire” is one step toward further study. There remains a broader question. In
an age where new technologies such as augmented reality blur the boundaries of the real
and virtual how do we achieve a consensus about norms of mental health against which we
make judgments about what is to be considered deviations from that norm? Since the period
of the enlightenment science has been the answer. But today we live in era of climate change
denial, political campaigns that ignore “fact checkers”, the rise of religious extremism where
competing versions of reality clash. If we add on to this the overlay of virtual worlds and
augmented realities, along the real possibility of malware and cyber attacks that might dis‐
tort what is heard and seen, where does it leave the rational understanding of the “real?”
How do we determine if “reality testing is intact?” And whose reality is it?
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